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Abstract
Despite the extensiveness of top-down control in his ideal city, Plato takes seriously the idea that
the market does not require total regulation via legislation and that participants in the market
may be capable of self-regulation. This paper examines the discussion of market regulation in the
Republic and argues that the philosopher rulers play a very limited role in regulating market
activities. Indeed, they are concerned only with averting excesses of wealth and poverty. The
rules and regulations that are foundational to the daily functioning of the market—enforcement
of contracts, resolution of disputes, etc.—are endogenous to the market participants themselves.
In allowing for this self-regulation, Plato expresses tempered optimism about the market and a
profound confidence in his ideal city’s educational program.
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1. Introduction
Many scholars read Plato’s Republic as an argument that idealizes totalitarianism and promotes
illiberal and paternalistic legislative strategies for the sake of realizing an ideal society. 1 The city
described within the dialogue’s pages, affectionately named Kallipolis, is defined by the
organization of its three classes—the producers, the auxiliaries, and the philosopher rulers—into
a hierarchy that sees the philosophers exercising ultimate control over the whole. The city achieves
‘complete goodness’ just in case it is wise, courageous, moderate, and just (Resp. 427e). 2 And
these virtuous conditions are achieved, in turn, through control that exerted by law. Critics of
Plato’s city are quite right, then, in observing that the state, conceived as city’s legal apparatus,
wields tremendous power.
The present argument concerns the extent of legislative oversight extended to a particular
domain of activity in the ideal city: the arena in which the members of city’s producer class create,
present, and exchange the goods and services that sustain the city’s material well-being. This
domain is the market, and it is a domain that receives little attention from Socrates. He introduces
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See, for example, K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London: Routledge, 1945); J.L.

Ackrill, Essays on Plato and Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 230–251; L.
Brown, ‘How Totalitarian is Plato’s Republic?’, in E.N. Ostenfeld (ed.), Essays on Plato’s
Republic (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1998), pp. 13–27; C.C.W. Taylor, ‘Plato’s
Totalitarianism’, in G. Fine (ed.), Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion and the Soul (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999).
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Translations of the Republic are by, or after, from G. M. A. Grube, revised by C. D. C. Reeve,

in John Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997).
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the notion of the market with the first of the three cities he describes in the Republic (Resp. 369d372d). This city presents the market as a tool for solving an existential problem. Each of us needs
food, clothing, shelter, and other basic goods in order to survive, and the production of these goods
is made vastly easier when we live together in cities and specialize in our production of goods,
consume our own share, and trade our surplus for that of others (Resp. 369d-370a). Specialization
and the power of exchange are presented by Socrates as the definitive tools of this first city, and
he insists that the city is both ‘true’ and ‘healthy’ even despite its apparent lack of any rulers or
regulators for market business. 3 Indeed, we might be tempted to assume that Plato is a market
optimist on the basis of that depiction of a flourishing and free market.

3

Glaucon christens this city a ‘City of Pigs’ due to its lack of any ‘relishes’ that more

sophisticated consumers would demand (Resp. 372c). For discussions of the first city as
representative of a market society, see R.C. Cross and A.D. Woozley, Plato’s Republic: A
Philosophical Commentary (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964), pp. 80–93; M. Schofield,
‘Plato on the Economy’ in M.H. Hansen (ed.), Saving the City: Philosopher-Kings and Other
Classical Paradigms (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 69–81; J. Weinstein, ‘The Market in
Plato’s Republic’, Classical Philology 104 (2009), pp. 439–458; D. Silvermintz, ‘Plato’s
Supposed Defense of the Division of Labor: A Reexamination of the Role of Job Specialization
in the Republic’, History of Political Economy 42 (2010), pp. 747–772; E. Helmer, ‘D’une
réciprocité à l’autre: la spécialisation des métiers et des fonctions comme principe d’unité
politique dans la République de Platon’, Archai 16 (2016), pp. 13–42; N. Sawatsky, ‘Plato’s
Economic Genius’, in P. Boettke, C. Coyne and V. Storr (eds.), Interdisciplinary Studies of the
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When ‘guardians’ are introduced in the second city—the ‘luxurious’ city in which nonbasic and unnecessary goods are produced and consumed—their role is not to regulate the market
(Resp. 373e-374a). Instead, they assist in the acquisition of neighboring territories that will supply
more resources for the market’s operations. Guardians are instruments in expanding the extent of
the market in that second city, not regulators. This lack of regulation should not be understood as
optimism, though, since the ‘luxurious’ city, in its contrast to the first city, is feverish and perhaps
‘untrue’ (Resp. 372e). The production and consumption of unnecessary goods perverts the nature
of the producer as well as the consumer. Everyone in the city becomes sick. Looking at the
depictions of market activity in the first and second cities, then, we cannot discern a final
evaluation of the market’s need for external control.
The focus of this article is the iteration of the market that is operative within the last of
three cities described by Socrates, his Kallipolis, and what laws, if any, are proposed for regulating
the agents in that domain. Whereas the market exhaustively accounts for the first city and operates
independently of any oversight from rulers, the market of Kallipolis is confined to just one of its
classes and made to operate in harmony with the remaining classes. And because Kallipolis alone
among the three cities described in the dialogue manifests ‘complete goodness’, its relationship to
the market should be taken as the Republic’s final word on the subject. Therefore, my discussion
takes the market of that third city as its focus. 4

Market Order: New Applications of Market Process Theory (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield,
2017), pp. 3-37.
4

Brevity requires that I also omit to discuss passages of Plato’s Laws that touch on market

activity. For such discussion, see S. Skultety, ‘Currency, Trade, and Commerce in Plato’s
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I begin, in section 2, with an observation of an important distinction that Socrates builds
between two levels of legislative activity. One level is that of the ‘founders’ of a city, and the other
is that of the city’s proper, internal rulers. Socrates and his interlocutors are founders of Kallipolis,
and the individuals they call philosophers are the city’s proper rulers. Legislation may be issued
from either legislative level. This distinction aids us in understanding a passage occurring at Resp.
425a–427a in the dialogue, where Socrates and one of his fellow founders of the city, Adeimantus,
explicitly discuss the issue of who should regulate the market. As will be shown, the dialogue’s
verdict on that question is difficult to discern, made difficult both by the fact of there being two
distinct levels of lawgivers for the city as well as by ambiguity in Socrates’ meaning when he says
that some market laws are discoverable by ‘anyone’ and others arise from a ‘way of life’ (Resp.
427a). Who is included among ‘anyone’, and whose ‘way of life’? Ultimately, I interpret Socrates
as prohibiting interference in market business from one legislative level, limiting such interference
from the other legislative level, and recommending self-regulation among market participants in
some areas of their business. I call this view moderate market optimism.
In section 3, I contextualize this interpretation within the larger argument of the Republic.
The idea of limited legislative regulation of market business will strike Plato’s critics as surprising,

“Laws”’, History of Political Thought 27 (2006), pp. 189–205. Skultety concludes that ‘Plato
worries that commerce and specific kinds of currency allow citizens to forget about civic life by
promoting an exclusive focus on either private concerns or cosmopolitan issues’, at p. 189.
Socrates of the Republic seems to share this assessment, but only as relates to the guardians of
the city, as if the guardians (comprising both auxiliaries and rulers) may be corrupted by material
goods while producers may not (Resp. 416e–417a).
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and may seem out of keeping with the Republic’s general attitude of disdain and distrust toward
producers, those least intellectual and most appetite-bound citizens of the city. What his allowance
of self-regulation for these citizens demonstrates, however, is how deeply Plato imagines the ideal
city’s educational program to penetrate the psyches and control the behavior of citizens. This
should reframe the way in which we figure Plato as a statist, perhaps not so much by diminishing
our sense that he endorses extreme control over citizens, but rather by highlighting that state-issued
legislation is not his sole, or even primary, means of control.
2. Interpreting the text
The passage in which Socrates first proposes the question of whether or not and how to regulate
the market demands careful scrutiny. The proposal arises in the context of Socrates, together with
Glaucon and Adeimantus, designing the lifestyle and work of the ruling class in the ideal city. The
activity ought to be considered ‘designing’ because Socrates and his interlocutors repeatedly say
that they are engaged in ‘fashioning’ (πλάττομεν) a happy city and ‘making’ (ποιοῦμεν) true
guardians (Resp. 4.420c, 421a). 5 They are, after all, the city’s founders, responsible for setting up
the laws that comprise its constitution. Having just agreed that their priority is to make the whole
city as good as possible and that they should ‘leave it to nature’ to ensure that each class, or perhaps
each individual, in the city achieves the happiness that is achievable for them, Socrates and
Adeimantus go on to specify particular domains over which the city’s proper, internal rulers will
need to engage their distinctive level of legislation for the purposes of safe-keeping the constitution
(Resp. 421c).

5

See also Resp. 419a; 420b; 423c.
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Specifically, ‘our guardians’—as Socrates calls them—will need to (i) ‘guard against in
every way’ both wealth and poverty (Resp. 421e), (ii) manage the size of the city such that it
remains ‘one in number’ (Resp. 423c), (iii) direct each of the citizens of Kallipolis to ‘what he is
naturally suited for’ (Resp. 423d), and (iv) ‘guard the one great thing’: ‘their education and
upbringing’ (Resp. 423e). Each of these tasks is emphasized as being crucial to the goal of
sustaining the ideal constitution that the founders of the city have fashioned in their imaginations.
And though none explicitly refers to the activity of legislation—instead focusing primarily on
‘guarding’—repetition of the word ‘to legislate’ (νομοθετεῖν) throughout the ensuing discussion
of which further domains require the oversight of the philosopher rulers indicates that the activity
by which they generally perform their work is that of legislating. 6 We can be sure, then, that the
discussion of how to manage market business in the ideal city is genuinely a question about
whether or not legislative regulation is appropriate for it.
Socrates and Adeimantus identify domains of activity and behavior that potentially require
the legislative intervention of the philosopher rulers from 425a. First are the ‘seemingly
insignificant conventions’ (νόμιμα) such as the deportment of children in the presence of elders,
or hair styles, or clothing trends (Resp. 425a–b). Here Socrates says that the well-raised people of
the city will ‘discover’ (ἐξευρίσκουσιν) these conventions for themselves, but also that ‘it is foolish
to legislate about such things’ because ‘verbal or written decrees will never make them come about
or last’ (Resp. 425b). ‘That’s why I wouldn’t go on to try to legislate about such things,’ he
concludes (Resp. 425c). There are two criteria by which the appropriateness of legislation in a
domain is established, then: (i) the extent to which well-raised persons may be expected to discover

6

The verb νομοθετεῖν appears at Resp. 425b, 425c, 425d, 425e, 426e, and 427a.
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the desired behavior independently and (ii) the extent to which the behavior is impervious to
legislative oversight regardless.
Market business is the next domain of activity to be considered. Note that Socrates’
question about whether or not to regulate the market pertains strictly to the legislative level of the
founders.

Then, by the gods, what about market business (τάδε τὰ ἀγοραῖα), such as the
private contracts people make with one another in the marketplace (τάδε τὰ
ἀγοραῖα), for example, or contracts with manual laborers, cases of insult or injury,
the bringing of lawsuits, the establishing of juries, the payment and assessment of
whatever dues are necessary in markets and harbors, the regulation of market, city,
harbor, and the rest—should we bring ourselves to legislate about any of these
(τούτων τολμήσομέν τι νομοθετεῖν)?
It isn’t appropriate to dictate to men who are fine and good (ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἄξιον, ἔφη,
ἀνδράσι καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς ἐπιτάττειν). They’ll easily find out many of these things
for themselves, as many as need to be legislated (τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτῶν, ὅσα δεῖ
νομοθετήσασθαι, ῥᾳδίως που εὑρήσουσιν).
Yes, provided that a god grants that the laws we have already described are
preserved (θεὸς αὐτοῖς διδῷ σωτηρίαν τῶν νόμων).
If not, they’ll spend their lives enacting a lot of other laws (πολλὰ τοιαῦτα
τιθέμενοι) and then amending them, believing that in this way they’ll attain the best.
You mean they’ll live like those sick people who, through licentiousness, aren’t
willing to abandon their harmful way of life?

8

That’s right.
And such people carry on in an altogether amusing fashion, don’t they? Their
medical treatment achieves nothing, except that their illness becomes worse and
more complicated, and they’re always hoping that someone will recommend some
new medicine to cure them. (Resp. 425c–426a)

Adeimantus and Socrates agree that they, as founders, should not issue legislation for the market
of Kallipolis, but whereas they had categorically declined both the appropriateness and the utility
of legislation concerning the ‘seemingly insignificant conventions’, here they have declined only
the appropriateness, and only from their own legislative level. They have deferred judgment to the
city’s internal rulers, allowing that ‘fine and good’ rulers will ‘easily find out’ what needs
legislating in the market, and they have left open whether or not such legislation has utility. Their
musing concerning the ‘licentiousness’ of those who pursue a harmful way of life is not a denial
of the utility of legislation concerning the market, but a denial of such legislation in a city that has
deviated from the four crucial orders already outlined.
The question, then, is what kind and how extensive will be the legislation that the
philosopher rulers issue for regulating market business. Adeimantus and Socrates are not in a
position to assess this themselves, seeing how they are leaving the work to the rulers. When
Adeimantus says that the philosopher rulers will ‘easily find out many of these things for
themselves, as many as need to be legislated’, he remains true to his word in refusing to dictate to
these good men. The matters that need to be legislated are ‘many’, but how many and what
specifically those matters will be is left undisclosed.
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Socrates and Adeimantus continue from this passage in their analysis of how the city’s
rulers will err if the earlier described laws are not preserved. They quickly return to the issue of
market business:

Don’t be too hard on them, for such people are surely the most amusing of all. They
pass laws on the subjects we’ve just been enumerating and then amend them
(νομοθετοῦντές τε οἷα ἄρτι διήλθομεν καὶ ἐπανορθοῦντες), and they always think
they’ll find a way to put a stop to cheating on contracts (περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις
κακουργήματα) and the other things I mentioned (καὶ περὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον),
not realizing that they’re really just cutting off a Hydra’s head.
Yet that’s all they’re doing.
I’d have thought, then, that the true lawgiver (τὸν ἀληθινὸν νομοθέτην) oughtn’t to
bother with that form of law or constitution (τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος νόμων πέρι καὶ
πολιτείας), either in a badly governed city or in a well-governed one—in the former,
because it’s useless and accomplishes nothing; in the latter, because anyone
(ὁστισοῦν) could discover (εὕροι) some of these things (τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν), while the
others follow automatically (τὰ δὲ ὅτι αὐτόματα) from the ways of life we
established.
What is now left for us to deal with under the heading of legislation (ἡμῖν λοιπὸν
τῆς νομοθεσίας εἴη)?
For us nothing (ἡμῖν μὲν οὐδέν), but for the Delphic Apollo it remains to enact the
greatest, finest, and first of laws. (Resp. 426e–427b)
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Again, we see Adeimantus and Socrates agree that legislation of market business is inappropriate
at some level. Particularly, they believe it is unsuitable for a ‘true lawgiver’ to ‘bother with that
form of law or constitution’. Who is the true lawgiver? Though the concept of a ‘true lawgiver’
might be predicable of individuals working at either legislative level, the fact that Socrates
explicitly refers to the ‘form of law or constitution’ as being within the scope of concern of the
‘true lawgiver’ suggests that he intends to refer to city founders since they alone are concerned
with designing a city’s constitution.7 Of course, Socrates and Adeimantus had already agreed, at
425d–e, they should not legislate about market matters, so reading this passage as merely
reiterating their agreement might seem redundant. We should note, however, that the earlier
agreement to decline interference pertained to cities in which rulers are ‘fine and good men’, while
here, at 427a, Socrates considers both the ‘badly-governed city’ and the ‘well-governed city’ in
tandem. When he says that a founder should not legislate about these matters even by way of

7

Some scholars have interpreted ‘true lawgiver’ as referring broadly to any lawgiver of a true, i.e.

good, city. Presumably this would include lawgivers at both legislative levels in the Republic. See,
for example, K. Fitzpatrick, ‘Forbidden Delicacies: The Ideal City, the Luxurious City, and the
Marketplace in Plato’s Republic’ in L. Trepanier (ed.), The Free Market and the Human Condition:
Essays on Economics and Culture (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), pp. 11–25, at p. 21–22.
Others insist it refers only to the philosopher rulers, for example C. Bobonich, ‘Why Should
Philosophers Rule? Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Protrepticus’, Social Philosophy and Policy
24 (2007), pp. 153–175. If ‘true lawgiver’ does refer to the philosopher rulers, then 427a explicitly
states that the philosopher rulers will not legislate on market business.

11

interfering on behalf of poorly and bad rulers, he makes clear that market business is categorically
not a domain for founder-level legislation.
But as to what this passage on market business finally recommends regarding legislation
from the level of the city’s internal rulers, it is still difficult to draw a conclusion. Socrates says
that founder-level legislation is inappropriate in a well-governed city ‘because anyone (ὁστισοῦν)
could discover some of these things, while the others follow automatically from the ways of life
we established’. This ostensibly explanatory claim raises some questions. First, although Socrates
seems to divide into two an otherwise unified category of items, it is unclear what unifies all of
these items in the first place. The problem is that there is not an obvious plural antecedent to the
partitive genitive (αὐτῶν) that Socrates uses in building his division. The clearest antecedent is
‘the form of laws and constitutions’ (τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος νόμων πέρι καὶ πολιτείας) that was said not
to be a concern for the true lawgiver (Resp. 427a2–3). 8 This choice is attractive due to grammatical
proximity. In strict terms of meaning and interpretation, though, this reading problematically
implies that design of both laws and constitutions are within the purview of the ‘anyone’ who will
discover these things for themselves. This result contradicts our understanding of the founders as
the exclusive designers of constitution. But if we elide the mention of constitutions and take ‘laws’
as the salient dimension of the antecedent, then we can understand ‘laws’ (νόμοι) regulating market
business as divided into the two sorts described above. Accordingly, Socrates submits that some
nomoi concerning market business are discoverable by ‘anyone’ and other such nomoi ‘follow
automatically’ from a way of life.

8

As Shorey notes, “εἶδος νόμων πέρι is here a mere periphrasis,” meaning that it refers to νόμοι,

not to something like a νόμος (343 n.δ).

12

The next interpretive puzzle concerns why some nomoi would be discoverable by ‘anyone’
(ὁστισοῦν). It seems strange for Socrates to claim that literally ‘anyone’ can discover nomoi. With
his delineation of two levels of legislation and his careful distinctions between them, he can
scarcely mean to collapse the apparatus entirely by conceding that any and all citizens of Kallipolis
can find out good laws. It is not in the work or function of the auxiliaries and producers to find out
laws anyway. The ‘anyone’ may be an overstated generalization, then. Socrates must mean that
the easily discovered laws are discoverable by the philosopher rulers. Indeed, if we understand the
‘anyone’ to be restricted to the philosopher rulers, then the line is an echo of the idea expressed at
425e that the philosopher rulers will ‘easily find out many of these things for themselves, as many
as need to be legislated’. These nomoi are, presumably, explicit legislative actions.
And the final puzzle concerns which—or whose—way of life gives automatic rise to the
second variety of nomoi. On one hand, because it is reasonable to understand the items that ‘follow
automatically’ as nomoi and because nomoi are the concern of the rulers, it is tempting to suppose
that these nomoi follow particularly from the peculiar way of life enjoyed by the ruling class. On
this interpretation, the nomoi ‘follow automatically’ from the rulers’ way of life in the sense that
the rulers use their own behavior as a model in writing the nomoi. The difference between the
varieties of nomoi, on this reading, is minimal. Both are attainable only by individuals who have
been brought up in a particular way, but one kind is found out through active searching and the
other kind is more passively received. They are both explicit legislative actions under the exclusive
control of the rulers.
On the other hand, the idea that the nomoi ‘follow automatically’ from a way of life is
strikingly reminiscent of the claim, at 425b-c, that ‘the start of someone’s education determines
what follows (τὰ ἑπόμενα)’. That utterance occurs in the context of Socrates explaining that it is
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‘foolish’ to try to legislate some norms of behavior—specifically, the ‘seemingly insignificant
conventions’—because ‘verbal or written decrees will never make them come about or last’ (Resp.
425b). These norms arise automatically as a result of the group adopting a certain set of beliefs
and values through their formative years, which beliefs and values are inculcated through the
education in music and poetry described in Books II and III. Most importantly, the norms are
adopted by the agents themselves rather than imposed upon them by any law. They are endogenous
norms, albeit contingent on early indoctrination, rather than exogenous laws. When Socrates says,
at 427a, that some market nomoi ‘follow automatically’ from a way of life, he echoes the 425a–b
idea that a particular upbringing and lifestyle will ensure the adoption of certain norms.
The latter reading is preferable. There is little sense in the idea that market nomoi might
‘follow automatically’ from the way of life of the rulers. Socrates says that the nomoi are
regulations that ‘put a stop to cheating on contracts and the other things I mentioned’ (Resp. 426e).
The ‘other things I mentioned’ are, surely, the market matters listed from 425a: ‘contracts with
manual laborers, cases of insult or injury, the bringing of lawsuits, the establishing of juries, the
payment and assessment of whatever dues are necessary in markets and harbors, the regulation of
market, city, harbor, and the rest’. These practices may certainly be carried out well or poorly,
justly or unjustly, but the rules that bring them into line with the good can scarcely be imagined to
‘follow automatically’ from a way of life that is explicitly stripped of private contracts, personal
possessions, material productivity, and consumerism. Such practices permeate the way of life of
the producers, however. And, just like the ‘seemingly insignificant conventions’, these practices
are particularized, sensitive to variation in circumstance, and knowable only through experience.
They are, in other words, governable only by endogenous rules if they are governable by any.
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Accordingly, we should understand the second variety of market nomoi as ‘following
automatically’ from the way of life of the market participants themselves.
When Socrates identifies two distinct origins for the nomoi that control the market and
allows that one of these origins is the way of life of the market participants, we can understand
him as suggesting that the producer class in Kallipolis is capable of a degree of self-regulation. Of
course, it must be the case that Kallipolis affords them some means of developing their capacity
for self-regulation, lest they never achieve the moral outlook necessary for such work. But,
nonetheless, Socrates’ argument depicts the producers as governing themselves in their business
interactions. Such self-regulation appears to be part and parcel of the work that belonging
exclusively to them.
3. The Self-Regulated Market in Kallipolis
I have argued that Socrates categorically declines to manage market business from the legislative
level of the founders and asserts that the city’s internal rulers certainly will engage in such
legislative management. But the extent of their legislative intervention is obscured by Socrates’
division of market-related nomoi into two sorts according to their distinct origins. Some market
nomoi are exogenous, originating with the philosopher rulers discovering what needs to be
explicitly legislated in the market, but some are also endogenous to the market, originating within
the producer class as a result of the way they are made to live in the ideal city. Some facets of the
market are regulated by the state, then, but others are left to the self-regulation of the market
participants. In this section I will consider what kind of optimism—if at all—this amounts to, and
how it accords with other features of the Republic’s argument.
Let us begin by distinguishing three degrees of market optimism: weak market optimism,
moderate market optimism, and full (laissez-faire) market optimism. The distinctions depend on
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Socrates’ contrast between the legislative level of the founders and that of the philosopher rulers.
According to weak market optimism, regulation of market business ranks among the tasks for the
philosophers rulers to attend to, but is not so paramount that it requires the founders to intercede
on behalf of the rulers. Weak market optimism counts as optimism in the sense that, on this reading,
Plato ranks market regulation as a second-tier imperative: It need not be established from the outset
in establishing the city as one of the conditions for making the city and its rulers just and good, but
instead can be left as a product or consequence of establishing the city and its rulers correctly.
Weak market optimism is compatible with understanding regulation of the market to be among the
most important tasks of the proper rulers. What makes weak market optimism count as weak is
only that Plato has, on this reading, counted market regulation as a task insufficiently important
for the establishment of justice to require Socrates’ intervention. 9
Moderate market optimism is more permissive of self-regulation on the part of the market
participants themselves. According to moderate market optimism, the rulers of the ideal city have
the power to intervene in the market as well as positive reason to legislate on some—even
‘many’—particular matters, but beyond those particular matters, the market participants can be
trusted to conduct their own affairs. Moderate market optimism counts as optimism in the sense
that it requires understanding market participation as morally inert for the producers. That is,
handling of money, engagement in contracts, and general consumerism do not have any inherent
corrupting influence. It is only some facets of those activities—the ‘many’ that require intervention
from rulers—that cannot be trusted to the participants. Full market optimism is the final alternative.
According to full market optimism, market regulation is inappropriate in general in the sense that

9

If the intervention of the founders were necessary, Plato would be counted a market pessimist.
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neither should anyone set up laws for market business from the outset in establishing the city, nor
should any rulers set up such laws once the city has been established. Arguably, we see full market
optimism in the first city since there is absolutely no exogenous legislation regulating the activities
of the market in that society and the outcomes of its free market are not only consistent with, but
actually productive of the health and flourishing of its citizens.
The ideal city is certainly not a place for full market optimism, as we have seen from
Socrates and Adeimantus’ agreement that the rulers will discover for themselves ‘many’ matters
that require legislation in that domain. But they also agreed that it is inappropriate for them, as
founders, to legislate on market matters, which indicates that the ideal city implements at least
weak market optimism. When Socrates distinguishes exogenous and endogenous market
regulation—in accordance with the interpretation I presented in the previous section—and
suggests that both will be implemented in the ideal city, it looks as though he endorses moderate
market optimism.
Socrates’ acknowledgement of contracts, torts, assessments of dues, and—explicitly—
'regulation of market, city, harbor, and the rest’ (ἀγορανομικὰ ἄττα ἢ ἀστυνομικὰ ἢ ἐλλιμενικὰ ἢ
ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα) demonstrate his understanding that the functioning of markets depends on some
protections and enforcements (Resp. 425d). Such rules and norms establish the shared expectations
that facilitate arbitration courts for resolving disputes, institutions for extracting fees for the
purpose of supporting important commercial infrastructure like roads and ports, and other social
tools for solving collective action problems as they might arise. If any of these matters—even just
a few of them—are left to the market participants themselves, then Socrates is imagining and
endorsing some degree of independence in the operation of the market. This is not the statism of
which Plato is often accused.
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But how does this moderate optimism comport with the depiction of Kallipolis and the
argument of the Republic? Two facets of the ideal city demand attention on this score: (i) the issue
of Socrates and his interlocutors requiring that the philosopher rulers ‘guard against in every way’
wealth and poverty in Kallipolis and (ii) the uncertainty concerning whether or not the producer
class is targeted for moral conditioning, whether in the form of the early education described in
Books II and III or otherwise. The first of these should be familiar from the beginning of my
discussion in section 2, where we encountered the founders articulating the need for guarding
against wealth and poverty as the first of four explicit orders to be issued to the city’s proper rulers
(Resp. 421e–422a). Given that wealth and poverty are undeniably tied up with material
consumption, they seem to be directly impacted by market activity and, thereby, controllable only
via market control. The second facet is an interpretative problem, the resolution to which could
determine finally whether or not the producers in the ideal city can be expected to be sufficiently
well-formed in their character to adequately self-regulate. 10 How do we understand these facets in
relation to moderate market optimism?

10

Many scholars deny that the education described in Books II and III is universal. See, for

example, S. Sauvé Meyer, ‘Class Assignment and the Principle of Specialization in Plato’s
Republic’, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 20 (2004), pp.
229–243; C.D.C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato’s Republic (Princeton
University Press, 1988), pp. 186–190; G. Hourani, ‘The Education of the Third Class in Plato’s
Republic’, The Classical Quarterly 43 (1949), pp. 58–60. See H. Jeon, ‘The Interaction between
the Just City and its Citizens in Plato’s Republic: From the Producer’s Point of View’, Journal of
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3.i. The Ban on Wealth and Poverty
It is quite clear that Socrates requires a strict ban on wealth and poverty in the ideal city. He is
worried that wealth and poverty each impede the production of goods and threaten the stability of
the city. ‘The former makes for luxury, idleness, and revolution; the latter for slavishness, bad
work, and revolution as well; (Resp. 422a). Producers who become wealthy lose their motivation
to tend to their craft, and those who fall into poverty lose access to the tools and other materials
means for exercising their craft well, or at all. It is for this reason that Socrates and his interlocutors
agree to order the city’s proper rulers to ‘guard against in every way’ wealth and poverty entering
the city. The emphatic ‘in every way’ makes clear that Socrates wants to grant permission to the
city’s proper rulers to utilize any means at their disposal for ensuring that these disruptions do not
plague the city. As the text stands, however, there is no particular means specified by Socrates or
the interlocutors as being most efficacious for this purpose. Indeed, Socrates indicates that he
deems it fit to delegate the matter entirely to the rulers—they will ‘see for themselves’ what needs
to be done (Resp. 423e). He declines even to specify a particular type of activity by which they
might carry out the work, opting to describe their task with a verb derived from their title (‘our
guardians (τοῖς φύλαξιν) must guard against (φυλακτέον) in every way…’).
This is precisely where Socrates’ moderate market optimism has tremendous explanatory
power in the argument. By emphasizing that some market-related nomoi will be discovered by the
philosopher rulers, he carves out a mechanism by which those rulers can ensure the ban on wealth
and poverty. Again, we do not know precisely what those nomoi are, but our ignorance of these

the History of Philosophy 52 (2014), pp. 183–203, and J. Thakkar, Plato as Critical Theorist
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), pp. 124 – 139, for arguments to the contrary.
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details is sensible enough given that we are engaged in describing the city from the level of the
founders and even the founders, Adeimantus tells us, are not in a position to declare what these
nomoi will be. The philosopher rulers, living in the city and understanding its particular resources
and distributions, are uniquely poised for anticipating the springs of wealth and poverty and
forestalling their emergence.
Further, because the philosopher rulers cannot be permitted to interfere too deeply in
market business, lest they meddle in the work of others and become distracted from their own
work, there must be a device by which their legislative role in the market is circumscribed. 11 The
distinction between the legislation issued by the philosopher ruler and the endogenously arising
nomoi serves just this role by allowing for the endogenous nomoi to complete the set of market
regulations necessary for the proper functioning of the market. The philosopher rulers are
responsible for ensuring the ban on wealth and poverty, and the market participants themselves are
responsible for ensuring the norms and expectations that sustain operation. The total ban on wealth
and poverty is not only compatible with moderate market optimism, but even clarifies it by
providing some indication of what laws might be among those that are discovered by the rulers

11

It is absolute, according to Book IV account of justice, that the philosophers cannot meddle in

the work of other classes. The necessity of setting some distance between them and the market
might additionally be supported by the need for limiting their exposure to money (Resp. 416e–
417b). For discussion of the corrupting power of money, see A. Schriefl, ‘Plato on the
incompatibility of wealth and justice: the property arrangement in the Republic’, History of
Political Thought 39 (2018), pp. 193–215.
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(the ones that ensure the ban) and what might ‘follow automatically’ from the way of life of the
producers (the ones that secure the functioning of the market itself).
How extensive is the market interference of the nomoi that ensure the ban? This is unclear
from the text because the specific means utilized by the rulers for implementing the ban are
undisclosed, except for the general indication that it will occur via legislation. Taxation is one
option. We can be sure that some form of taxation is levied upon the producers. When Socrates
says that the city’s guardians will enjoy a moderate lifestyle funded by ‘taxation on the other
citizens as a salary for their guardianship’, there is no possibility other than that the ‘other citizens’
are the producers and that the taxation is conceived as fair payment for service (Resp. 416e). What
form this taxation takes is unclear, however. Plato does not specify whether it is their income, their
property, or their exchanges in foreign or domestic trade, that will be taxed. 12 He also does not
indicate whether or not this taxation doubles as a mechanism for controlling wealth and poverty in

12

Plato was himself familiar with many distinct modes of taxation. In texts produced by his

contemporaries and near contemporaries in Athens, there is mention of varying percentages of
import and export taxation; taxes on silver, on foreigners, and even on prostitutes; taxes within
demes; several types of tax upon wealth; grain taxes; taxes for funding state cults; tributes for
membership in the Delian League; etc. See P. Fawcett, ‘”When I Squeeze You with Eisphorai”:
Taxes and Tax Policy in Classical Athens’, Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of
Classical Athens 85 (2016), pp. 153–199, for a survey of these modes of taxation and the texts in
which they are mentioned or described. Plato could have any of these, and any number of them, in
mind when he mentions taxation the mere four times that he does so in the course of the Republic,
at 343d, 416e, 566e, and 568d.
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the producer class. In stating that tyrants levy heavy taxes upon their citizens expressly for the
purpose of keeping them poor—'for that way they’ll have to concern themselves with their daily
needs and be less likely to plot against him’—Plato demonstrates his understanding of taxation as
a tool for, at least, producing poverty (for those taxed) (Resp. 567a). This is a strong indication
that he might also understand taxation as a tool for averting poverty and wealth. But ultimately
there is no indication that taxation is the means he has in mind in Book IV.
What stands is that Socrates identifies only some market-related nomoi as being the
exclusive responsibility of the rulers. How they discover and enact these nomoi, even what those
nomoi are, is something that Adeimantus and Socrates agree should be left to the rulers themselves.
They are disinclined to specify those nomoi from the outset. This comports with the interpretation
I have been defending of Socrates being a moderate market optimist. He allows the remainder of
the market-related nomoi to be endogenously generated from the way of life enjoyed by the market
participants themselves. Of course, the possibility of their lifestyle generating appropriate nomoi
depends on the moral quality of that way of life, and so the next issue to address is the issue of
education: who receives it in the ideal city.
3.ii. The Education of Producers
The early education is first introduced in Book II, when Socrates completes his description of the
traits found ‘in the nature’ of one of the city’s guardians. ‘But how are we to bring him up and
educate him?’ (Resp. 376c). Together with his interlocutors, Socrates goes on to describe a
program in music and poetry as well as physical training that will mold any individual with the
requisite nature into a person ‘who achieves the finest blend of music and physical training and
impresses it on his soul in the most measured way’ (Resp. 412a). There is no mistaking what group
Socrates imagines to be recipient of this education as he describes it. All of this description quite
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plainly indicates that the education is for future guardians—tailored to their nature and with the
outcome of establishing graduates as ‘overseers in our city’ (Resp. 412a). On the basis of these
passages, it looks as though the conception of education in the Republic, given that it excludes
producers, cannot comport with moderate market optimism.
Several passages within the dialogue tell against the exclusion of the producers, however,
and the arc of Socrates’ argument for the role of the philosopher rulers requires that the producers
be included to some extent. Here I consider two passages that explicitly identify the producers as
recipients of some education, and I also discuss how the dialogue’s argument requires that we
understand some parts of the early education as universal in this way.
The first passage occurs in Book III, in the context of Socrates explaining the importance
of the education in music and poetry and the qualities that such an education will cultivate in the
guardians who receive it. Through exposure to music and poetry that is possessed of ‘fine words,
harmony, grace, and rhythm’, the guardians develop these qualities within themselves (Resp.
400d). Socrates then points out that many crafts are possessed of these same qualities. ‘Now, surely
painting is full of these qualities, as are all the crafts similar to it; weaving is full of them, and so
are embroidery, architecture, and the crafts that produce all the other furnishings’ (Resp. 400e–
401a). The upshot of this, Socrates suggests to Glaucon, is that the poets are not alone among the
craftsmen in needing their work to be supervised by the philosopher rulers. All the craftsmen will
be forbidden to represent anything incongruous with the moral message of the city. Only those
craftsmen ‘who are by nature able to pursue what is fine and graceful in their work’ will be
permitted to produce images in the city (Resp. 401c). All of this is necessary because—this is
where Socrates seems to suggest the necessity for universal education—'anyone who has been
properly educated in music and poetry will sense it acutely when something has been omitted from
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a thing and when it hasn’t been finely crafted or finely made by nature’ (Resp. 401e). The
producers, being foremost in position of needing to recognize when something has been finely
crafted or not—seeing how they are themselves the craftsmen—will need to receive the education
requisite for performing this aspect of the work. 13
This passage, admittedly, sits strangely within a dialogue that has already underscored that
anything with a particular function will perform that function well just in case it exercises its
‘peculiar virtue’ (Resp. 353c). If it is a peculiar virtue that allows for performing one’s function
well, then it seems odd that Socrates would make the additional claim that the education in music
and poetry generates a set of virtuous qualities that universally allow for any craftsmen to perform
their function well, that is, to produce a good product of their kind. To resolve this, we must
observe that the peculiar virtue allows for the function to be performed ‘well’ (εὖ), while the Book
III passage claims that the education enables individuals to ‘sense it acutely’ when something is
‘finely’ crafted (καλῶς). It is strictly the peculiar virtue that is necessary for producing, say, a table

13

A helpful reviewer has pointed out that only a minority of craftsmen produce goods that might

be considered ‘cultural’ artifacts of the sort that Socrates has identified as needing moral
regulation. This seems right, and it might incline us to think that only that subset of the
population stands in need of a moral education to direct their work. But it is undeniable that
Socrates believes moral beliefs are influenced by daily environment every bit as much as they
are influenced by formal education. See, for example, his descriptions of whole lifestyles as
destructive in the degeneration passages of Books VIII and IX. The social class peers to the
‘cultural’ artisans will need to be moral peers in every way, and therefore stand in need of the
same education.
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that is a good instance of a table, and the music and poetry education that enables one to assess
whether or not that table is in keeping with what is morally fine (κᾶλον).
We might be inclined to conclude from this that the producers are in possession of their
requisite peculiar virtues but that they may nevertheless lack the capacity to assess their own work
for its fineness. Accordingly, the guardians are shaped into product assessors for the purpose of
scrutinizing and censoring the work of the producers. This is an undesirable result, however, seeing
how it requires that both the auxiliaries and the philosopher rulers intervene entirely in the work
of the craftsmen, effectively doing their work for them in violation of the dialogue’s account of
justice. To avoid this result, we must understand the craftspeople of Kallipolis as recipients of
those parts of the city’s education that are sufficient for enabling them to actively produce their
goods in accord with the standard of fineness. The city’s justice requires that they have this
independence in their work.
Another passage, 414d, includes the producers more explicitly. It is here that Socrates
introduces the ‘Noble Lie’. He says, ‘I’ll first try to persuade the rulers and the soldiers and then
the rest of the city that the upbringing and the education we gave them, and the experiences that
went with them, were a sort of dream’. This explicitly discloses that the founders intend for the
producers (‘the rest of the city’) to be targets of the cultural messaging that is the Noble Lie itself,
but also suggests that they are intended recipients of an upbringing and education delivered by the
rulers. 14 The cultural messaging certainly does not exhaustively account for what is conveyed by
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See E. Brown, ‘Minding the Gap in Plato’s “Republic”’, Philosophical Studies 117 (2004), pp.

275–302, at 298n.44, who draws out this implication. Also in relation to the Noble Lie passage,
F.M. Cornford, The Republic of Plato (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941), at p. 62, points out that,
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the early education described in Books II and III, and it is unlikely that the producers could undergo
their requisite craft apprenticeships and specialized training while also undergoing the full extent
of the music and poetry program and physical training. But they could be exposed to some
elements of both, absorbing universal cultural messaging through folktales and other devices for
disseminating such ideas, all while developing in their specialization.
Hourani explicitly denies that we should understand the Noble Lie passage in this way. The
guardians, he argues, have ‘no time for the vast and unprofitable burden of mass education’. 15 The
dedication of resources is not justifiable, on this view, because the moral education of producers
‘will never fulfil any function’, a circumstance which cannot be at home in Plato’s Republic,
premised as it is on the notion that the good for anything is in the doing of its own work, i.e.
function (Resp. 353e). But Hourani, and other scholars who pursue this line of thought, overlook
the way in which the cultivation of character among the producers does serve a function. 16 In fact,
it serves two functions: the function of the rulers in persuading the citizens to work for the
collective good and the function of the producers themselves in regulating their own behavior in

without some provision of a universal education, the lie cannot serve its purpose of motivating the
citizens to aid the rulers in watching for gold- and silver-souled citizens who should be sent off to
the guardian class: ‘unless they share in the early education provided for the Guardians, there could
hardly be opportunities for promoting their most promising children to a higher order’.
15

G. Hourani, ‘Education of the Third Class’, p. 59.

16

C.D.C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, pp. 186–190, provides the most extensive argument for this

position.
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their domain of activity, the market. 17 The producers are not isolated and entirely independent in
their production of goods and services, but they are necessarily embedded in a network of
exchanges whereby they procure raw materials and tools for their crafts, build relationships with
buyers and merchants, and also engage in the marketplace as consumers of the myriad goods they
need for sustenance even outside of the peculiar needs of their craft. Exposure to the modes of
music and poetry that cultivate good character in the guardians would serve the function of the
producers as well, even if to a lesser degree. 18
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H. Jeon, ‘Interaction’, at p. 184, has emphasized these two dimensions as the producers’

contribution to harmony within the city and their being ‘largely self-directed moral agents who do
not require constant supervision to do the right thing’. Jeon’s focus is the moral status of the
producers, i.e. their ability to be self-directing in their moral lives, while my focus is on their
independence in the marketplace, but I agree with the insistence that the provision of education is
indispensable to the project of making citizens independent.
18

H. Jeon, ‘Interaction’, p. 186n.9, suggests that the producer children may receive all the same

benefits as guardian children, on account of the early education cultivating non-rational capacities
rather than rational ones. R. Kamtekar, ‘Imperfect Virtue’, Ancient Philosophy 18 (1998), pp. 315–
339, and J. Wilberding, ‘Plato’s Two Forms of Second-Best Morality’, Philosophical Review 118
(2009), pp. 351–374, each discuss the ways in which education and character cultivation are
beneficial for non-rulers in the ideal city, but they limit their discussion to auxiliaries and express
some skepticism about whether or not the producers receive any education or, even if they do, are
psychologically positioned to benefit in the way auxiliaries do.
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As for how Socrates’ moderate market optimism sits with the arc of his extended argument
in the dialogue, we can discern the necessity of providing an education to the producers through
examining how Adeimantus and Socrates discuss the reason why the fourth of their orders to the
rulers, the one regarding the guarding of education and upbringing, is paramount. Adeimantus
proposes that through tight control of music and poetry in particular, the city’s rulers will secure
law-abidingness and regimentation of character among all the citizens of the city (Resp. 424c–e).
This is expressed somewhat indirectly, through positing the outcome of neglecting music and
poetry rather than through positing what will be achieved:

When lawlessness has established itself [in music and poetry], it flows over little
by little into characters and ways of life. Then, greatly increased, it steps out into
private contracts, and from private contracts, Socrates, it makes its insolent way
into laws and government, until in the end it overthrows everything, public and
private. (Resp. 424d)

Adeimantus identifies the steps by which lawlessness will infect a city that inadequately shapes
the characters of its citizens. A crucial step in that infectious spread is the point at which
lawlessness infects the business of private contracts. This should alert us that the producers are
intended recipients of the education because they alone in the ideal city engage in private contracts,
the members of both guardian classes being forbidden to do so. 19 Private contracts are neither first
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That the guardians are forbidden to engage private contracts is an inference drawn from

Socrates’ insistence both that guardians be prohibited to possess ‘any private property beyond
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nor the last point of the infection’s spread, indicating that it is a point where the spread may be
stopped just in case that handlers of private contractors—the producers themselves—are of
sufficiently robust character for resisting lawlessness. If the spread stops there, then ‘laws and
government’ may be spared.
This is taken as capturing the true impact of education, and Socrates expresses his
agreement by saying that ‘when children play the right games from the beginning and absorb
lawfulness from music and poetry, it follows them in everything and fosters their growth,
correcting anything in the city that may have gone wrong before’ (Resp. 425a). With the education
carefully guarded, the rulers will need only to implement legislation for averting wealth and
poverty, but the market participants themselves will be in a position—psychologically, in terms of
their desires, and institutionally, in terms of possessing the means of self-regulation—to impose
rules upon themselves for bringing about and sustaining the nomoi necessary for a well-functioning
market and also for averting the worst harm that the city may suffer.
4. Conclusion
‘The start of someone’s education determines what follows’ (Resp. 425b–c). This is the sentiment
that I have drawn out for consideration in this paper and set as a first principle of the market
participants in Kallipolis possessing the ability to conduct their own affairs and be significantly
self-determining—much more self-determining than a standard interpretation of Plato qua
totalitarian may permit.

what is wholly necessary’ (Resp. 416d) and that lawsuits will ‘pretty well disappear from among
them, because they have everything in common except their own bodies’ (Resp. 464d). Any need
for privacy in contract is precluded by these conditions.
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I have argued that Socrates of the Republic embraces moderate market optimism because
he declines to issue any market regulation in his role as founder of the ideal city and permits only
some of the city’s market-related nomoi to be issued by the philosopher rulers. The remaining
market-related nomoi are conceived by him as endogenous to the market participants themselves
just in case they are brought up in such a way as to enjoy a lifestyle from which appropriate nomoi
will ‘follow automatically’ from the way they live. The childhood games and cultural messaging
that shape the early beliefs of the producers results in them becoming capable of self-regulation in
this way, and this depiction of market participants as self-regulating is moderate market optimism.
Of course, the genuine strength of Plato’s optimism is tempered by the fact that it is
conditioned on otherwise successful governance in the city, and specifically on the success of the
both the founders and the city’s proper rulers in controlling the character development of all
citizens. Plato’s harshest critics would rightly demur at the idea that ‘market optimism’ correctly
describes a program of self-regulation that depends on conformity of thought, habits, and value to
the extent that the Republic, according to my interpretation, proposes. Nevertheless, the
interpretation offered here should shift the conception of statism that critics might foist on Plato.
He does not aim to extensively regulate the behavior of citizens through the state apparatus of
legislation, but instead to cultivate independence in morally good decision making. These
conceptions of control are radically different, not only in their mechanism, but also in their outputs.
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